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In finance, as in pathology, we can learn more from failure
than from success. This lecture examines three famous financial
failures, Metallgesellschaft’s oil futures business, LTCM and relat-
ed hedge fund failures, and the current travails of ENRON, and
performs a post mortem on each to see what can be learned. Not
surprisingly, the cause of death was similar in each case, or, to put
it more familiarly, history always repeats itself. [JEL Code: G30;
G38]
Introduction
I used to tell people I was a financial engineer, until I rea-
lized that that was as misleading as a coroner saying he was a
doctor. After the Hunt brothers of Texas, Bunker and Herbert, had
their comeuppance in the silver markets of 1979 and 1980, I was
retained as an advisor to help sort out the mess. In 1987 I worked
with some large real estate funds that were experiencing the con-
sequences of the decline in the U.S. real estate market and the
fallout from the S&L crisis. In the early 90’s I analysed mortgage
portfolios that had exploded in that volatile market. Later in the
decade I advised Metalgesellschaft (MG) on the problems they had
*The author is grateful to Ron Dembo and Ken French for helpful comments,
but is solely responsible for the contents which may or may not reflect the opi-
nions of these individuals. This talk borrows liberally from an earlier work by the
author, see ROSS S.A., «Forensic Finance», Risk Magazine, 1999.
FOURTH ANGELO COSTA LECTUREwith the oil markets. I was there when the hedge funds exploded
in the summer of 1998, and now I am learning about ENRON, 
TYCO, WORLDCOM and the latest corporate casualties. 
I’m not a financial engineer; I’m a financial pathologist. I do
financial autopsies and I am a specialist in forensic finance - hence
the title of this Lecture. The reason pathologists study the dead,
though, is not so much morbid curiosity as it is that from what
we learn, we can help the living. With a disease or an accident
we want to know the cause, with the hope of developing a cure
or preventing it from happening in the future. For healthy and
successful ventures, it is nearly impossible to really know why they
succeeded; there are a thousand claimants to the success. We fo-
cus on forensic finance because failures, especially mega failures,
shout their shortcomings. 
In the U.S. some of the most successful television shows are
about crime scene investigators and their cases. These are usual-
ly gruesome murders, and the crime scene team solves them by
examining the bite marks on the corpse and deducing that the
murderer was a fifty year old, Italian, left handed ex tennis play-
er with a slight limp. In this paper I am going to do the same. I
will tell you the results of three famous cases and what I have
learned from them in the hope that this will be the beginnings of
a more rigorous understanding of what are the essential short-
comings of failed enterprises. 
1. -  Metalgesellschaft (MG) and Oil
Although I was an advisor to MG, I will only rely on the pub-
lic record. In the early 1990’s a group of oil traders employed by
MG, a large and venerable German trading company, decided to
pursue the following strategy. First, they sold oil and petroleum
contracts with delivery commitments extending over periods as
long as ten years and with embedded options for the buyers. Se-
cond, for each barrel of oil sold they purchased one barrel of a
short duration futures contracts. As these contracts matured new
positions were continually being established to replace them. 
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severe contango in 1992, margin payments on the futures con-
tracts exceeded $1 billion and nearly bankrupted MG. MG sur-
vived its foray into oil trading, but it was in intensive care for a
long time. What follows are the autopsy findings and notes from
the examination of the cadaver of its oil business. There are some
central lessons that emerge from a careful examination of this
case, and, as we shall see, these lessons reverberate through the
other cases we will look at. 
To begin with, the oil traders had a theory. Prior to 1990 about
70% of the time the oil futures markets were in backwardation,
which is to say that the prices of long term contracts were lower
than those of short term contracts. As contracts matured, then, their
prices were expected to rise, producing cash profits to the holders.
Second, from a pure accounting perspective, the delivery commit-
ments were perfectly hedged by the futures contracts. When a one-
to-one hedge eventually expires the holder recovers any margin
losses from price changes or pays them back if prices rose. Every
dollar made or lost on a futures contract would eventually be lost
or made when the final oil delivery to the customer takes place. 
A blind allegiance to a particular theory or strategy is a cen-
tral feature of all financial debacles. Unfortunately, though, bad
things happen that were not anticipated by the theory, and this is
the second lesson. Enormous and historically unprecedented
changes in prices and the business environment always occur in
short time periods. In the oil markets spot heating oil prices fell
by over 50% in a matter of months. The hedge guaranteed that
on, say, a ten year delivery contract, accounting profits would
equal accounting losses ten years out, but that was little comfort
when the market demanded approximately $1 billion to cover cur-
rent margin losses on the futures contracts. These payments had
to be financed and recovering the $1 billion ten years from now
wouldn’t begin to cover the interest charges on the financing. 
The theory was flawed and the bad event of the price drop
only made this flaw painfully apparent. Correctly taking into ac-
count interest costs and the relative near and far term volatilities
of the oil futures markets showed that the net position with the
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ply sold the oil contracts and not bothered to hedge. 
The third lesson is a classical one from finance. Financial mar-
kets are efficient in the sense that prices reflect up to date infor-
mation. Furthermore, the markets are populated with astute
traders whose business is processing information and profiting
from it. Liquid markets — no pun intended — are too efficient
for  naïve and simple strategies to give sure profits. Spreads do
narrow and fundamentals do reassert themselves. The drop in oil
prices was a consequence of a natural supply response. High
prices brought forth more oil supplies and lowered oil demand.
But, there is too much competition in the markets for any spread
bet, in the case of MG a simple rolling of futures contracts, to
consistently make money. There is always some significant risk of
losing big, and any static, simple system is doomed to failure. 
The fourth lesson is that big dollars attract big attention. With
their huge short delivery positions, specialists in the oil markets
knew that MG would have to roll their expiring positions, and by
some accounts, these traders were waiting eagerly when they did
so. It is very costly to move a big position particularly when every-
one is watching you, and it is impossible to be nimble. Elephants
can waltz but they cannot tap dance.
Lesson five is that in times of distress, liquid debts always
beat illiquid assets. Simply put, in a crisis only cash is liquid. The
delivery contracts were highly illiquid and difficult if not impos-
sible to sell at a reasonable price. Who would finance the MG po-
sitions based on the delivery strategy alone? Since the strategy
wasn’t self-financing, MG had to reach into its general borrowing
lines to pay its liquid market debts and avoid bankruptcy.
Lesson six concerns the complexity of the business. While the
strategy was relatively simple, its implementation and analysis was
not. The complex delivery contracts and the massive size of their
futures positions made a simple evaluation of the economics of
MG’s oil trading difficult. Complexity creates opacity and this
makes a business vulnerable; the more opaque and complex a
business is, the more difficult it is to finance. Complexity makes
controlling risk all the more difficult.
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we shall see later, one of the most important, concerns what eco-
nomists call agency costs. The MG traders were employees of MG
and their interests were not necessarily aligned with the interests
of the shareholders. This is what is meant by an agency cost; it
is the cost to the firm and to its owners of managing this mi-
salignment. It is difficult to align the interests of employees and
owners and impossible to do so exactly. The failure to do so in
this case puts a greater burden on monitoring and controlling em-
ployees, which is a component of agency costs. 
Now let us turn now to our second example of financial car-
nage, hedge funds in the summer of 1998. 
2. - Hedge Funds - 1998
In the summer and fall of 1998 a number of hedge funds
“blew up”. Creditors called in their loans as the values of their
collateral positions deteriorated and investors demanded their
money back. The most famous of these, Long Term Capital Man-
agement (LTCM) underwent a structured refinancing led by the
Federal Reserve Bank. Perhaps there is a virus going around, be-
cause, despite the seeming differences in the cases these patients
died from the same illness that afflicted MG oil trading.
Most of the hedge funds that went under were followers of
a strategy known as convergence trading. Whenever the spread
between two apparently equivalent positions — e.g., holding a
portfolio of a one year and a five year Treasury bond versus hold-
ing a three year bond — gets larger than historical norms, a con-
vergence strategy attempts to make money by shorting the ex-
pensive leg of the position and purchasing the cheap one. This is
a bet that historical norms will reassert themselves and, despite
its sophistication, it is very similar to the MG bet on its roll strat-
egy. In other words, this was the “theory” that provided the busi-
ness logic for many of these funds. 
Of course, even if spreads return to these normal historical
relations, it can take a long time, and, in the interim, if spreads
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of 1998 were some of the most volatile periods in the history of
the financial markets and spreads did, indeed, widen in what ap-
peared — myopically — to be historically unprecedented levels.
The resulting losses bankrupted many funds. 
Despite the efficiency of markets, with much intelligence, ex-
perience and just plain common sense, trading can make money.
After all, it is precisely by using their information and expertise
that savvy traders profit. In doing so, they make aberrant prices
converge to correct values which is precisely how markets become
efficient. But, simply betting on the convergence of spreads to hi-
storical norms suffers the same irrational optimism that charac-
terized the MG positions. If it were this easy to make money, then
everyone would be doing it.
As with MG, big dollars once again attracted much attention.
LTCM was the signature case. With positions of over $100 billion,
leverage of about 25 to 1 and nominal footings of over $1 trillion
dollars, everyone who was anyone in the financial markets was
involved. If you weren’t an investor you were a creditor and, with
manic press ravings about the downfall of capitalism, the go-
vernment had to get involved. In the end, no matter what the eco-
nomics, LTCM was going down and there was no place for it to
hide. Stories abounded about the scavengers in the market know-
ing LTCM’s situation and waiting to prosper by the inevitable un-
winding of their positions.
The hedge funds that went under were textbook examples
of the adage that in times of crisis, liquid debts are king. As-
sets and position holdings may be marked-to-market, but debts
are contractually stated. In difficult times, why should a lender
risk anything on the convergence of prices when they can sim-
ply demand their money back immediately and force liquida-
tion? Liquidity dries up just when those who are in trouble most
need it. In times of market turmoil, creditors — given their own
agency problems — call in lines of credit and force distress
sales.
The sixth lesson to be learned is the drawbacks of com-
plexity. With their craving for secrecy and the complexity of their
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cial institutions. Not only does complexity make it difficult for
outsiders to understand what the fund is doing, it also makes it
difficult for even the managers of the funds to control and un-
derstand the risks in their own positions. LTCM had over 70,000
positions. 
Agency costs were the final MG lesson and hedge funds were
subject to these as well. Hedge fund fees are structured to align
incentives, but monitoring and control are still required. While its
not clear that a misalignment of fees directly contributed to the
failures in 1998, it is clear that the misalignment grew much more
severe after 1998. For example, manager fees are often propor-
tional to the profits above some previously achieved “high water
mark”. When the fund falls precipitously, though, the current va-
lue may be so far below the high water market that the fund ma-
nager no longer has any meaningful incentive. This is similar to
the pressure on corporations to reset employee stock options when
the company stock has fallen significantly.
There is one new lesson to be drawn from the hedge funds
that was present with MG but less apparent; leverage is risky and
big leverage is dangerous. Leverage magnifies potential gains and
losses and this clearly adds to the risk at the same time that it
raises the potential for additional returns. This subtly interacts
with agency costs. For example, left uncontrolled a fund manager
might choose more leverage than clients would want since the
client suffers the losses while the manager shares in the gains. In
addition, whatever the systems, models, and theories employed,
leverage strains the assumptions that underpin them. At LTCM’s
25 to 1 leverage — unless you are buying and selling exactly the
same instruments (a five year bond and a four year and ten month
bond will not do!) — controlling risk by mathematical pricing
models becomes troublesome. Interestingly, though, for LTCM it
would be wrong to dismiss the pricing models and their efficacy.
After all, in what is a remarkable and ironic tribute to modern fi-
nancial modeling, with its huge $100 billion positions, LTCM “on-
ly” lost about $3 billion.
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Everyday the newspapers and media are filled with lurid
stores chronicling the latest corporate debacle. From WorldCom
to TYCO to ENRON and others, hardly a day goes by without
some new and scandalous revelation. To hear the press talk, this
has never happened before, and, once again, we listen to prema-
ture predictions of the downfall of capitalism and how greed will
cause the markets to self-destruct. Of course, there isn’t anything
really new about all of this; the stories are the same and over the
years only the names change. In the immortal words of the pi-
anist at Rick’s club in the movie Casablanca: “Play it Again Sam”.
ENRON succumbed to the same disease as MG and LTCM, albeit
with some unique and somewhat unsavoury twists of its own.
ENRON’s strategy was to acquire assets or businesses where
trading markets are bilateral and not well established. The focus
was the energy business, but their grasp extended further than
electricity to include the internet, the telecommunications spec-
trum, steel, and other activities. The basic objective was to mo-
dernize these markets by introducing financial instruments and
derivatives for trading and hedging. To implement this strategy,
ENRON would buy a stake in a venture in a target market —
BADCO. Characteristically, BADCO would have high initial costs
and a hoped for long term payoff. The number and complica-
tions of these deals is daunting, but to simplify matters the fi-
nancing of a typical deal looked something like this. First, EN-
RON would set up an offshore SPV, NEWCO, partially funded
by outside investors. NEWCO would buy BADCO from ENRON
or hedge BADCO’s risks thereby taking BADCO off of ENRON’s
books — usually at a profit to ENRON. But, ENRON would re-
tain control of NEWCO and would guarantee NEWCO against
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1 The following references provided helpful background material for this Sec-
tion: INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION (ISDA) «17th Annual Ge-
neral Meeting», Berlin, 17 April 2002, Financial Engineering News, n. 26, June-July,
2002; PARTNOY F., «Testimony at the Hearings before the United States Senate Com-
mittee on Governmental Affairs», Financial Engineering News, n. 26, June-July
2002; The New York Times, October 3, 2002.losses — sometimes by using ENRON shares as collateral. The
ENRON story is still unfolding, but as it copes with bankruptcy,
it bears all of the signs of the same illness that struck MG and
LTCM.
As with the other financial collapses, lurking in the back-
ground, there is always a theory. ENRON’s “theory” was based on
its belief that it could profit by making inefficient markets effi-
cient. The wide bid/offer spreads typical of inefficient markets
were profit opportunities. ENRON hoped to “commoditize” these
markets and prosper by narrowing the inefficient spreads. The
strategy was implemented by using offshore special purpose ve-
hicles (SPV’s). “Aggressive accounting techniques” kept losses and
risks off ENRON’s balance sheet, presumably insulating its stock
price from bad news.
But, like MG, this theory has some inherent flaws. ENRON’s
ventures are long term investments and some long term invest-
ments don’t ever pay off and, if they do, it can take a long time.
Furthermore, using your own stock to finance a sale of your own
interests in BADCO to NEWCO and controlling NEWCO isn’t a
sale at all — it is overly aggressive accounting. Even aggressive
accounting must eventually realize deep losses and ENRON’s fi-
nancing could only work in a rising market. Theories, however
flawed, can always be right some of the time. 
Unfortunately, though, bad things happen. Contrary to what
many had come to believe in the 1990’s, stock prices actually do
fall as well as rise. With the collapse in the US stock markets, EN-
RON stock and all of its other ventures fell in value along with
the market. The leverage inherent in ENRON’s structures magni-
fied the fall. Using ENRON stock to finance the SPV’s works as
long as it’s rising. As the market fell, ENRON and its SPV’s suf-
fered accelerating losses. Furthermore, as word of its overly ag-
gressive accounting practices leaked out, the stock price fall ac-
celerated, and, as the reality became more apparent, the ENRON
house of cards collapsed.
Beyond the fact that untoward events do occur, though, the
lesson from efficient markets cannot be so easily dismissed, and
that is a fundamental problem with the ENRON theory. Ineffi-
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teral trading arrangements and other peculiarities exist for solid
economic reasons. Steel, as an example, has so many different
grades and delivery options and relies so heavily on individual
quality assessments, that it is unlikely that a uniform contract and
market will ever be established.
This might all have never come to anybody’s attention if it
had happened to a small regional oil trader instead of one of the
largest and most written about companies in America. As always,
big dollars attract big attention. ENRON had grown to be one
of the largest companies in terms of valuation in the world, di-
rectly employing over 20,000 people. Its shares were held by
nearly all of the major institutional investors and its collapse was
felt by all of them. As occurred with LTCM, there was no place
for ENRON to hide. To try and satisfy its creditors by selling as-
sets, for example, would only bring distress prices in a market
where its distress was common knowledge. In addition, regula-
tory and legal pressure mounted, eliminating any real flexibility.
If any flexibility had been available, the extensive debt of EN-
RON certainly would have eliminated it. ENRON held BADCOs,
i.e., illiquid investments, and it also had extensive borrowings to
finance its operations and assets. There was no ready market for
its illiquid assets, and creditors forced it into bankruptcy. Credi-
tors liquid claims always trump illiquid assets, and this occurs
no matter how large the “fundamental” value of the illiquid as-
sets.
Nor was ENRON any different from the hedge funds or MG
in terms of its complexity or its leverage. ENRON’s intricate ac-
counting and financing structures were opaque to the market. It
is only with the autopsy of the ENRON cadaver are they begin-
ning to be understood, and the process is far from complete. In
a crisis of both liquidity and confidence, complexity is an enemy
of the firm; it makes it increasingly difficult to attract prospective
white knights at reasonable prices.
As for leverage, financing SPV’s with ENRON stock is a form
of leverage. When the SPV’s assets decline, the call on additional
ENRON stock accelerates the decline in ENRON stock value. The
18 Stephen A. Rosslosses are now multiplied relative to what would occur with le-
gitimate outside financing and independent SPV’s
2.
The final lesson, agency costs, however, is what sets ENRON
apart. It is not that this didn’t arise with the hedge funds and with
MG - it certainly did, and that was where we first identified it as
a problem. With ENRON, though, it was moved to the forefront.
If we had to identify a single root cause of ENRON’s demise,
agency issues and the failure to deal with them would be the main
culprit, and we deal with it below in a separate section.
4. - ENRON and Agency Costs
Agency issues are endemic in a corporate setting where own-
ership and control are separated; management runs the compa-
ny not the shareholders. In the case of ENRON, the evidence of
the difference in incentives between the management and the
board on the one hand, and the shareholders on the other is
mounting. As an example, ENRON management held direct eco-
nomic stakes in the SPV’s. To the extent to which these interests
were not coincident with those of ENRON, incentives are clear-
ly misaligned. 
Agency problems are dealt with by a combination of three ap-
proaches. First, agents, i.e., managers, must be monitored. Second,
incentives have to be aligned, and, third, managers have to be con-
trolled. Turning first to monitoring, there are a number of inter-
nal and external tools available for doing so. 
Monitoring is usually thought of as an accounting function,
and the foundation of monitoring is the auditing function. To be
effective, external auditors must be economically independent.
Roughly speaking, this means that the economic cost to the au-
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these financial debacles and a need for further regulation. In some cases, e.g., Ba-
rings, Orange County, and Procter & Gamble derivatives take center stage. Beyond
what we have said about their complexity, though, the mere fact that derivatives
and financial engineering were employed has little more to add to our post
mortems. Would regulation really have stopped the problems of ENRON? And
what about TYCO in which derivatives appeared to have played little or no role?ditors of possibly skewing their report must outweigh the eco-
nomic advantages of the particular engagement they have. 
Accompanying the external audit, there must also be an in-
ternal auditing function and a separation of risk control from risk
taking. Internal auditing is an important risk control mechanism
for senior management in its efforts to control those who report
to them. Like external audits, internal audits must also be inde-
pendent, but there is no way to assure this unless internal audi-
tors and risk monitors report directly to the board of the compa-
ny and, to some degree, feel free to do so without interference by
the very management to whom they also report.
The firm’s legal advisors also perform a monitoring service.
All lawyers have an ethical code to which they are pledged to con-
form. Internal lawyers have such an ethical code, but they report
to upper management and that puts them in a conflicted position.
While they presumably have every incentive to report accurately
to upper management on the activities of those under them, mat-
ters become more awkward when it comes to directly advising se-
nior management on its own activities. Do they represent share-
holders or management? Outside lawyers are similarly conflicted.
Who is the client? Is it management who has retained them for
the corporation or is it the shareholders who have a voice only
through management?
The function of monitoring by accountants, lawyers, and
risk control personnel, though, is not merely to identify prob-
lem transactions and activities. These are really only symptoms
of problems. The main issue is the question of whether the in-
centives of the managers are aligned with those of the in-
vestor/owners.
When managers can prosper through their outside holdings
in SPV’s that do business with their company, incentives are mi-
saligned. At the least, the manager should prosper only if the com-
pany does so. Managers are not like rats in a maze that go wher-
ever the cheese is put. What is important, though, is that the
cheese not be in a different place from where you want them to
go. The role of compensation and incentives is not so much to
motivate management to do what is in the best interests of the
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mixed signals with its compensation rewarding them for activities
that are not in the best interests of the company. At ENRON there
was a profound agency problem with incentives apparently woe-
fully misaligned.
Of course, there would be no need to align incentives if, on
their own, management adopted the goals of the stockholders. Or,
to put it more broadly, if people were honest we could do away
with a lot of economics. If all managers wanted to act in the in-
terests of stockholders and thought that was the ethical thing to
do — as most managers in my experience actually do strive to
achieve — then there would be far less of a need for monitoring
and control. Unfortunately, though, this was not the case at EN-
RON and no ENRON autopsy would be complete without men-
tion of some simple and self-evident ethical precepts; what hap-
pened at ENRON offended the sensibilities of most observers and
shamed many in the corporate sector. 
While there is no objective test for honesty, there are some
simple tests or, at least, indicators for dishonesty. For example,
apparently at ENRON the board was asked to suspend the cor-
porate code of ethics to permit some of the SPV structuring with
management having stakes in the SPV’s. This had to be a red
flag to the board, and, in general, it is inconceivable to me that
this behavior can be justified in the name of acting in the in-
terests of the shareholders. As a last point on ethics and hon-
esty, it is often observed that reputation induces honest behav-
ior, but, unfortunately, reputation alone cannot be relied upon
to do so infallibly. To put it simply, «Everyone has their price»
- and there is always enough of a current reward to tempt the
unscrupulous to sacrifice their reputation for an immediate pay-
off. 
When ethics and incentives fail, the final internal line of de-
fence lies with the board. Ultimate control in the corporate struc-
ture resides with the board of directors; be it the German super-
visory board or the US style board of directors. Presumptively, the
board is both a resource for management as it deliberates strate-
gy, and, also, the corporate representative of the interests of the
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tion. Unfortunately, there is no simple recipe for having the board
do so in a manner that clearly serves the interests of sharehold-
ers, although it is my experience — albeit from observing healthy
companies — that this is generally what directors strive to achieve.
In the case of ENRON, the initial evidence clearly points to a
board that was overly dependent on management. But, as one ex-
ample of the difficulty in avoiding these problems, consider the
commonly proposed remedy of having a preponderance of inde-
pendent directors. Contrary to popular wisdom, I am unaware of
any study that shows clearly that independent directors enhance
company performance, which is to say there is no evidence that
they make shareholders better off.
Further complicating the role of the directors is that, inso-
far as they are not inside management directors, they will al-
ways have limited knowledge of the workings of the company
certainly relative to management. What is the board to do then?
It is my view that the greatest asset of Board members is not so
much their intimate knowledge of the particulars of the business
as it is their ability to judge the integrity and competence of
management.
Lacking clear rules, boards — and their advisors, the ac-
countants and the lawyers — must turn to judgment and stan-
dards. In the end, the process is a human one and laws and re-
gulations cannot be the sole answer.
Finally, beyond the board, the ultimate solution to a failure
of corporate control to deal effectively with agency problems is
the market and the market for corporate control. If a company is
broken then it will be devalued in the market, and a cheap com-
pany is a target company. While an entrenched and malevolent
management can fight a takeover, a good legal system will allow
value-enhancing takeovers. But, this simple market solution is
rarely the best approach. It may be inevitable, but it is a very cost-
ly way to correct a malfunctioning company, and, when they are
feasible, the internal solutions of aligning incentives and moni-
toring are far more efficient.
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Having identified a list of symptoms of failing ventures it is
tempting to think of this as a problem in need of a solution. I
think of it in no such terms. To once again use a medical metaphor,
companies and ventures that die often do so for a good reason,
much the same as cells in the body die and are replaced by new-
er and healthier ones. The object of the lessons is not to prevent
all companies from failing and certainly not to prevent new ones
from starting up. Rather, it is a set of indicators that companies
and individuals can use to assess the vulnerabilities of the ventures
in which they are involved. In a healthy economy, companies are
born and they die at a rapid pace and anything that interferes with
that process is to be viewed with great suspicion.
Not surprisingly, though, the fallout from these cases and,
most importantly, from ENRON, has included much activity on
the regulatory front. The Sarbanes-Oxley bill passed in the Uni-
ted States is the most tangible and permanent regulatory response
to the ENRON collapse and to the accounting horror stories from
Worldcom, TYCO and other demises. 
While there is much of value in the Sarbanes-Oxley bill, there
is also much to be wary of. As a general rule, regulatory and le-
gislative activity follows any period of financial tragedy, and, how-
ever well intentioned, its statutes are often structured in some
haste and as much in response to the drama of the events as to
the logic. Not unexpectedly, they usually take the form of pro-
hibiting certain activities that were held up by the media as
grotesque examples of abuse, and rarely do they take account of
the reality that the cure might be worse than the disease.
Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, establishes an accounting over-
sight board, which reads well on paper, but certainly in its awk-
ward and stilted initial formation has not inspired much confi-
dence. One hopes that the adult outstrips the child. The bill goes
on to prohibit a wide range of services provided by auditing firms
to their clients on the premise that allowing the firms to provide
these services will tie them too closely to the firms and make them
passive captives rather than aggressive outside auditors.
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ously. An auditing firm generally acquires much expertise about
the companies that it audits. Not permitting auditing firms to of-
fer this expertise as consultants is certainly not efficient. But, per-
haps the efficiency gains are outweighed by the loss in indepen-
dence and accountability. Here the economics gets a bit murky. 
As an example, suppose that an auditing firm is paid $5 mil-
lion for an audit and $20 million for ancillary consulting services.
When the two are unbundled, another firm doing the consulting
and not the auditing might charge $22 million for the service be-
cause it would have to learn what the auditor knows as a bypro-
duct of the audit, and a firm that simply audits might have to
charge $6 million for the audit if it cannot spread the costs over
consulting as well. If the auditor is to put in the same effort and
can no longer utilize the fruits of this effort for consulting acti-
vities, it will certainly have to charge more for the audit. Not on-
ly is it the case that uncertainty and increased liability will raise
audit fees, this straightforward economics will also push them up.
This, in turn, will certainly have the effect of imposing dispro-
portionately higher costs on smaller firms and, at the margin, will
further dissuade them from entering the public markets.
But, what of the incentive for the auditing firms to cave in to
a large client that offers both consulting and auditing? This is a
bargaining situation. When the auditing firm no longer consults,
the group within the firm that audits will be smaller and if ac-
countants’ time is charged with at least the same embedded pro-
fits from all activities, then the auditor will have the same pres-
sure to cave with or without consulting. Simply put, if 20 part-
ners were consulting and 5 were auditing, if only the 5 are now
auditing, and, say, collecting only one fifth of the original fees,
their fees per auditor will be the same and their response to firm
pressure will be unchanged. If the resources devoted to auditing
are to remain the same, then the profits from doing so will not
decline. 
Clearly, though, the supporters of this legislation have in mind
the case of a firm that agrees to the firm’s pressure on the $5 mil-
lion audit to retain the profits from the $20 million consulting
24 Stephen A. Rosscontract. But, this must be contrasted with the firm that charges
$6 million for the audit and does no consulting. Firms that spe-
cialize in audits alone will be smaller and more under pressure
than the was the typical firm prior to the legislation. The profit
for them from a $6 million audit will be as meaningful and as
open to pressure as the profits to a scaled up firm from doing
both activities. 
Another way to make the same point is to consider it from
the point of view of the firm that is being audited. In a world
where they hire one firm to do both activities and pressure the
firm to compromise its audit, presumably some portion of the,
say, $5 million in profits that the auditing/consulting firm received
was a compensation to the firm for running the risk of doing so.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this was $1 million. Now
the auditing firm alone is smaller and who is to say that the same
$1 million payment might induce them to even further largesse.
A cynic might argue that to the extent that the bill fragments the
auditing industry further it transfers even more power to the au-
dited firms.
There are many more aspects to the bill, but a detailed analy-
sis is really the subject of another talk. The point is that in the
wake of some dramatic financial event, we are often subjected to
new regulations despite the lack of any clear evidence that doing
so will generally improve the functioning of the capital markets,
let alone economic welfare more generally. What we do know is
that this regulation establishes further barriers to entry to the ca-
pital markets and raises the overall costs of doing business. 
Having said that, though, I do believe there is a problem in
the U.S. with accounting and, more generally, with monitoring
and I believe that the problem lies in a subtle place. We tend in
the U.S. to think that if there is a problem then it can be solved
with more laws and more regulations. I actually think that this is
part of the problem.
It used to be that when I went to a doctor he would tell me
whether or not I was healthy. Not any more. Now the doctor says
to me “We have yet to find anything wrong with you”. This well
may be more literally accurate, but that isn’t the point; the change
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the change occurred because doctors are afraid of being sued. It
also used to be the case that accountants would be willing to opine
after the books were closed that, “My opinion is that this fairly
represents the financial condition of this firm”. Accountants don’t
do that any more and the reason is also the enhanced liability
they face.
As a consequence of the increased visibility and activity in
tort lawsuits, experts no longer give opinions based on judgment,
rather, they seek out narrowly defined “safe harbors” in the law
and the regulations. Furthermore, the system encourages them to
lobby for more and more issues to be resolved by statute and less
by judgment. We are clearly moving from a system of standards
to a system of regulations and statutes, and in a world of ever in-
creasing complexity, that is a mistake. My personal view is that
this is one of the biggest costs of our failure to institute mean-
ingful tort reform in the United States. 
Nor should my European friends be too smugly complacent
about this. I predict an increasingly active bar in Europe that will
press for class action lawsuits modeled after the American exam-
ple. There is nothing inherent in the legal system that prevents it,
and while you do have some existing legislation on capping
awards, that, too, is subject to the whims of the political process. 
Some Concluding Observations
Financial history is littered with corpses who have died to tell
us their stories, and our analysis has provided us with a diag-
nostic tool, namely the questions to ask of any business venture
to insure that it stays healthy. We should also be sure to ask them
of successful businesses and not hold them in reserve for an au-
topsy. 
However dramatic the individual cases, though, it would be
wrong to make too much of these events and to jump too quick-
ly to the conclusion that the system needs a radical overhaul. In
my experience, dramatic incidents are the main engine for regu-
26 Stephen A. Rosslatory and legal changes in the financial markets, and, in the haste
to take some action, the resulting changes are rarely well enough
thought out. What is remarkable is not the failures, but rather
how exceptional they are and how well the market system seems
to work overall. There is no need to close this Lecture on a note
of doom. While the stock markets have fallen from their highs of
a couple of years ago, they are still quite high by historical stan-
dards and that surely speaks to the confidence that investors still
maintain in them.
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